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Abstract. Designing and developing distributed and concurrent appli-
cations has always been a tedious and error-prone task. In this context,
formal techniques and tools are of great help in order to specify such
concurrent systems and detect bugs in the corresponding models. In this
paper, we propose a new framework for debugging value-passing process
algebra through coverage analysis. We illustrate our approach with LNT,
which is a recent specification language designed for formally modelling
concurrent systems. We define several coverage notions before showing
how to instrument the specification without affecting original behaviors.
Our approach helps one to improve the quality of a dataset of exam-
ples used for validation purposes, but also to find ill-formed decisions,
dead code, and other errors in the specification. We have implemented
a tool for automating our debugging approach, and applied it to several
real-world case studies in different application areas.
1 Introduction
Recent computing trends promote the development of software applications that
are intrinsically parallel, distributed and concurrent. However, designing and de-
veloping distributed software has always been a tedious and error-prone task, and
the ever increasing software complexity is making matters even worse. Therefore,
it is impossible for any human being to foresee all the possible executions of this
kind of application, which thus can hardly be free of bugs. In this context, formal
techniques and tools are of great help in order to detect bugs in abstract models
of concurrent systems. Although we are still far from proposing techniques and
tools avoiding the existence of bugs in complex, real-world software systems, we
know how to automatically chase and find bugs that would be very difficult, if
not impossible, to detect manually.
A variety of formal specification languages has been developed over the last
few decades, such as algebraic specifications (CASL), state-based formalisms
(VDM, Z, B), automata-based languages (FSM, UML state diagrams, State-
charts), Petri nets or (value-passing) process algebras. Process algebras were
designed for modelling concurrent systems and present several advantages com-
pared to similar specification languages (such as automata-based languages or
Petri nets): they are equipped with formal semantics, compositional notations,
and are expressive enough to provide several levels of abstraction (e.g., data
with LOTOS or mobility with pi-calculus); real-world systems can be specified
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using textual notations, and there exist several verification toolboxes for them
(CADP, mCRL2, LTSA, FDR2, etc.). In contrast, the syntax of process alge-
bras is still hard to understand and use, particularly for non-experts. In order
to fill this gap, LNT [7] was proposed a few years ago. LNT is a value-passing
process algebra inspired from the E-LOTOS standard [19] and from imperative
programming languages. LNT supports both the description of complex data
types and of concurrent processes using the same user-friendly syntax. LNT
specifications can be analyzed using CADP [13], a toolbox that provides various
verification techniques and tools such as model checking, compositional verifica-
tion, or performance evaluation. LNT is already used by several universities for
teaching and research purposes, and by companies (such as STMicroelectronics
or Orange labs) for designing and verifying different kinds of systems.
When using model checking techniques as those available in CADP, we usu-
ally have an LNT specification of a system, a dataset of validation examples,
and a set of temporal properties to be verified on the system being designed.
When we apply the LNT specification on a validation example, we obtain a La-
belled Transition System (LTS), which corresponds to all the possible executions
of the specification for this example. These LTSs are computed automatically
using CADP exploration tools (enumerative approach). A validation example
defines a set of inputs to the LNT specification and is similar to a test case
in the testing domain. The LTS generation without explicit inputs might turn
out to be impossible due to the enumeration on possibly infinite data domains.
Bounding the exploration is a solution but this often results in huge LTSs (state
explosion), which are therefore very long to analyze. This is why, in this setting,
we prefer to work with a set of concrete inputs that we call validation examples
in this paper.
The aforementioned properties can be verified on the generated LTS using
model checking techniques. At this stage, building the set of validation examples
and debugging the system is a real burden, in particular for non-experts. Coun-
terexamples (sequences of actions violating the property) provided by model
checkers are the only feedback one may have, and analysing such diagnostics
may be very complicated, especially when the counterexample consists of hun-
dreds of actions. More precisely here are a couple of issues that may arise during
this phase: (i) we do not know whether the set of validation examples covers all
the possible execution scenarios described in the LNT specification; (ii) the LNT
specification may contain ill-formed decisions, non-synchronizable actions, and
dead code, which require to be corrected, and are not necessarily found using
model checking techniques.
Structural coverage is considered as one important metric of software quality
and is normally used in implementation testing [21]. Coverage criteria can guide
the selection of test cases as well as software reliability estimation. One common
approach is to use coverage analysis for measuring the quality of the suite of
test cases, which is often evaluated by its ability to detect mutants, i.e., po-
tential faults that are artificially inserted [16]. Several coverage criteria are well
established, such as instruction coverage, decision coverage, data-flow coverage,
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and path coverage. In this paper, we explore a different angle of the same ques-
tion that relates to specification coverage. We demonstrate how to improve the
quality of validation examples, and more importantly to debug specifications
through coverage analysis. Formal specification languages have already bene-
fited from tool-supported coverage metrics, such as SDL with Telelogic’s Tau
that measures the coverage of states and transitions, and VDM with IFAD’s
VDMTools [2].
In this paper, we are interested in debugging value-passing process algebra
through coverage analysis, and we applied it to LNT specifications. We first de-
fine block, decision, and action coverage for specifications before showing how to
insert probes to collect coverage information. Then we present how to analyze
coverage based on the collected information in two steps. In the first step, we
simultaneously analyze block and decision coverage to locate uncovered areas.
We define a relationship between blocks and decisions, which is used to detect
ill-formed decisions as well as to choose the uncovered parts that may contain
non-synchronizable actions. In the second step, we perform action coverage anal-
ysis in these selected uncovered parts to find out the non-synchronizable actions.
We implemented a tool to automate our approach, and we applied it to more
than one hundred LNT specifications including six real-world case studies. It
is worth emphasizing that we found several important issues for these speci-
fications (e.g., incomplete dataset of validation examples, ill-formed decisions,
non-synchronizable actions, and dead code).
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We developed new techniques to debug formal specifications, illustrated by
LNT.
– We proved that applying our techniques has no impact on the original be-
haviors of the system by proving branching equivalence preservation.
– We implemented these techniques as a tool, CAL, built on top of the publicly
available and widely-used CADP verification toolbox.
– We applied CAL to more than one hundred LNT specifications including six
real-world systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce
LNT. In Section 3, our solution for LNT coverage analysis is presented, including
how to insert probes without impact on the original system behaviors as well as
how to compute coverage in two steps. Section 4 describes our implementation
and experimental results. Sections 5 and 6 present related work and concluding
remarks, respectively.
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2 Overview of LNT
The LNT specification language is an improved variant of the E-LOTOS stan-
dard [19]. LNT combines the best features of imperative and functional pro-
gramming languages on the one hand, and value-passing process algebras on
the other. Therefore, LNT supports both the description of complex data types
and of concurrent processes using the same user-friendly syntax. LNT formal
operational semantics is defined in terms of LTSs. For the sake of brievity, we
show in Table 1 the syntax and semantics of a fragment of LNT, where xi and
Ti represent a variable and its type respectively, E denotes a logical expression,
V is either a variable or an expression with type coercion, and Vi are its possible
values [7].
Table 1. Syntax and operational semantics of LNT fragment
B ::= stop | B1; B2 | select B1[]...[]Bn end select
| par G in B1||...||Bn end par | if E then B end if
| case V in V1 → B1 |...| Vm → Bm end case | while E loop B end loop
(SEQ1) B1
β
−→ B1′
B1;B2
β
−→ B1′;B2
(SEQ2)B1
δ
−→ B1′ B2
β
−→ B2′
B1;B2
β
−→ B2′
(SEL)
k ∈ [1, n] Bk
β
−→ Bk′
select B1[]...[]Bn end select
β
−→ Bk′
(PAR)
k ∈ [1, n] Bk
β
−→ Bk′ gate(β) 6= G
par G in B1||...||Bn end par
β
−→ par G in B1||...||Bk ′||...||Bn end par
(COM)
I ⊆ [1, n] ∀k ∈ I.Bk
β
−→ Bk′ gate(β) = G j ∈ I
par G in B1||...||Bn end par
β
−→ par G in B1||...||Bj ′||...||Bn end par
(IF1)
JEK = true B
β
−→ B′
if E then B end if
β
−→ B′
(IF2)
JEK = false
if E then B end if
δ
−→ stop
(WHILE1)
JEK = true B
pi
−→ B′ B′
δ
−→ B
while E loop B end loop
pi
−→ while E loop B end loop
(WHILE2)
JEK = false
while E loop B end loop
δ
−→ stop
(CASE)
j ∈ 1, ...m (∀k ∈ 1, ..., j − 1)JV == VkK = false, JV == VjK = true Bj
β
−→ B′
case V in V1 → B1 |...| Vm → Bm end case
β
−→ B′
LNT processes are built from action, sequential composition (;), choice (se-
lect), parallel composition (par), condition (if, case, while), and termination
(stop). Communication is carried out by rendezvous on gates G (multiple syn-
chronization points) with bidirectional transmission of multiple values. For sim-
plicity, in Table 2, we consider actions with only two values being sent in both
directions. The gate on which an action β takes place is denoted by gate(β), and
we use pi to denote a sequence of actions. Particularly, an action can be an emis-
sion (!) or a reception (?). The special action δ is used for successful termination.
The internal action is denoted by the special gate i, which cannot be used for
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synchronization. Processes are parameterized by sets of actions (alphabets) and
input/output data variables.
LNT specifications can be analyzed using CADP [13], a verification tool-
box dedicated to the design, analysis, and verification of asynchronous systems
consisting of concurrent processes interacting via message passing.
3 Coverage Analysis
In this section, we show how to analyze structural coverage for LNT specifi-
cations, which helps one to improve the quality of the dataset of validation
examples as well as to detect several issues in the specification, i.e., ill-formed
or unnecessary decisions, non-synchronizable actions, and dead code.
3.1 Terminology
One well-known coverage criteria is the instruction coverage, i.e., the number
of executed instructions out of the total number of instructions. It is used for
measuring code quality, i.e., checking the existence of non-executed code. How-
ever, this coverage requires checking each instruction separately, which is not
efficient for large programs. Since several instructions can be in the same block,
for efficiency reasons it makes more sense to keep track of blocks rather than
individual instructions. Note that 100% block coverage implies 100% instruction
coverage. This is why we choose block coverage as the first criterion. However,
from block coverage, we cannot deduce outcomes of decisions, e.g., whether a
loop reaches its termination condition or whether the false outcome of a decision
is evaluated. To solve this, we consider decision coverage as the second criterion,
which takes a more in-depth view of the program. Furthermore, note that for
LNT, synchronization points between processes are modelled by rendezvous on
synchronized actions. To check whether all actions are well designed to be syn-
chronizable, we choose action coverage as a third criterion. It is a special metric
for concurrent languages.
Let us define the notion of blocks for LNT. We first define control instructions
in LNT that will be used to determine blocks.
Definition 1 (LNT Control Instruction). The Control Instructions (CIs) of an
LNT specification include conditional instructions (if, case, while), parallel
and choice ones (par, select), and termination (stop).
Definition 2 (LNT Block). Given an LNT specification, an LNT block is the
largest sequence of instructions free of CIs. Particularly, we call a block without
action a silent block.
Now we formally define the notion of coverage for blocks, actions, and deci-
sions. In the following, we simply call LNT block as block if there is no ambiguity.
In LNT, a decision is a Boolean expression composed of conditions and zero or
more Boolean operators. Particularly, for case statements, each branch is con-
sidered as one decision. For example, given the following case statement:
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case V in V0 → I0 | V1 → I1 | V2 → I2 end case
we have the following three decisions, one per branch:
– V == V0;
– V == V1;
– V == V2.
Definition 3 (Covered block, action, and decision). Let s be an LNT specifica-
tion and ds be a dataset of validation examples. We have the following notions:
– a block b (an action a, resp.) in s is said to be covered w.r.t. ds if b (a, resp.)
is executed by at least one example e ∈ ds, denoted by Cs:Bds (b) (C
s:A
ds (a), resp.),
simply CB(b) (CA(a), resp.) if there is no ambiguity;
– a decision d in s is said to be covered w.r.t ds if ∃e1, e2 ∈ ds, such that the
true outcome of d is evaluated by e1 and the false outcome is evaluated by
e2, denoted by C
s:D
ds (d), simply C
D(d). Specially, if only true (false, resp.)
outcome of d is evaluated, we denote this by CD:t(d) (CD:f (d), resp.).
Definition 4 (Block (Decision, Action, resp.) coverage). Let s be an LNT spec-
ification and ds be a dataset of validation examples. Block (Decision, Action,
resp.) coverage w.r.t. s and ds, denoted by BCsds (DC
s
ds, AC
s
ds, resp.), is the
percentage of the number of covered blocks (decisions, actions, resp.) out of
their total number. Formally, BCsds = ‖Bc‖/‖B‖ (DC
s
ds = ‖Dc‖/‖D‖, AC
s
ds =
‖Ac‖/‖A‖, resp.), where Bc = {b ∈ B | C
B(b)} (Dc = {d ∈ D | C
D(d)},
Ac = {a ∈ A | C
A(a)}, resp.) and B (D, A, resp.) is the set of all blocks (de-
cisions, actions, resp.) in the given specification. If there is no ambiguity, we
simply denote the three coverage as BC, DC, and AC.
3.2 Probe Insertion
To measure structural coverage of LNT, we instrument the code with probes in
order to collect coverage information. Before showing how to do this, we first
define LTS, which will be used to explicitly capture such coverage information.
Definition 5 (LTS) An LTS is a tuple L = (SL, s
0
L, ΣL, TL) where SL is a
finite set of states; s0L ∈ SL is the initial state; ΣL is a finite set of actions;
TL ⊆ SL ×ΣL × SL is a finite set of transitions.
Given an LTS obtained from applying an LNT specification on one validation
example, the only elements of the specification contained in this LTS are actions.
Hence, to analyze the structural coverage, we propose to insert probes as new
actions, whose presence in the LTS explicitly shows their coverage information.
When inserting such probes, it is important to preserve the original system
behaviors when all probes are hidden as internal actions. It is reasonable to
consider probes as internal actions because they are represented by fresh and
non-synchronized actions, which do not interfere with the existing instructions.
In the following, we denote the set of LTSs corresponding to the dataset of
validation examples by ∆.
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Block. To measure the block coverage, we insert a probe P at the end of each
block. The presence of P in ∆ implies that its associated block is covered, i.e.,
∃L ∈ ∆, such that P ∈ ΣL.
Decision. Table 2 illustrates how probes are inserted for decisions in LNT.
For decision coverage, to obtain the evaluated outcome(s) of a given decision
E, we equip the corresponding probe with this decision as its parameter, i.e.,
P (!E). The parameter !E displays the outcome of the decision E. Precisely, if
the decision E is evaluated to both true and false for a validation example, then
in its corresponding LTS, we have the action P !TRUE as well as P !FALSE.
Otherwise, if it is evaluated to only true (false, resp.), what we obtain in the
LTS is P !TRUE (P !FALSE, resp.). The decision E is covered if ∃L1, L2 ∈ ∆,
such that P !TRUE ∈ ΣL1 , P !FALSE ∈ ΣL2 .
In Table 2, for the if construct, we add the corresponding probe just before
it to catch its outcome. For the case construct, its operational semantics is to
sequentially pick the first condition that holds true. To capture such semantics,
we first represent a decision for each branch by a different probe, i.e., P1 for
V = V1 and P2 for V = V2. At the beginning of each corresponding branch, we
add its probe with parameter TRUE and the probes representing all its prece-
dent branches with parameter FALSE. In this way, only probes with evaluated
decisions appear in the corresponding LTSs. For the loop construct (while),
probes should be inserted both before and after the corresponding construct to
guarantee that both outcomes of the decision are obtained if it is covered. Oth-
erwise, with the probe only before the construct, we will never capture the false
outcome if the value of decision is first true and then becomes false. With the
probe only after the construct, the true outcome cannot be caught in the same
situation.
Table 2. Probe insertion for decisions
Types Before Insertion After Insertion
If if E then B1 end if P (!E); if E then B1 end if
Case case V in V1 → B1 |V2 → B2 end case
case V in V1 → P1(!TRUE);B1
|V2 → P1(!FALSE);P2(!TRUE);B2 end case
While while E loop B1 end loop P (!E); while E loop B1 end loop; P (!E)
Action. For action coverage, we insert a probe just after the target action, whose
presence in an LTS indicates that this action is covered. Even though actions
can be manifested by themselves in LTSs, probes are still necessary. The reason
is that in an LNT specification, one action may be used several times at different
places. Each appearance of an action is called its instance. The presence of an
action in ∆ does not mean that all its instances are covered. To determine which
exact instance of an action is not yet covered if there is any, we use different
probes to distinguish all action instances.
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Critical block and decision. Now we define critical blocks and decisions that
are located at the beginning of a choice branch, whose corresponding probes
should be inserted in a different way to preserve system behaviors.
Definition 6 (Critical block (decision)). Given a silent block (decision), if it
is a subpart of a select construct such that there is no action before it in the
corresponding choice branch, then it is called a critical block (decision).
Intuitively, given a critical block or decision, if we insert its probe as described
before, this probe becomes the first action in the corresponding choice branch.
In this case, the branching structure will be altered (τ.a+ b and a+ b, in a CCS-
like notation [20], are not branching equivalent). To solve this problem, Table 3
shows how to insert probes for critical blocks and decisions in a different way
to keep the original behaviors, where Bsi denotes a silent block. For a critical
block, an additional variable, initialized as 0, is used to indicate whether this
block is completely executed. This variable is then used as the parameter of
the corresponding probe inserted after the choice construct. If the value is 1
(0, resp.), then this block is covered (not covered, resp.), represented by P (!1)
(P (!0), resp.) in the corresponding LTS. For a critical decision, an extra variable,
initialized as 2, is used as the parameter of the corresponding probe inserted after
the choice construct. The value being 1 (0, resp.) represents true (false, resp.)
outcome of the decision. Particularly, if the value is 2, then the decision is not
even evaluated.
Table 3. Probe insertion for critical blocks and critical decisions
Criterion Types Before Insertion After Insertion
Block
select Bs
1
[] B2 end select
tag:=0; select Bs
1
; tag:=1 []
B2 end select P (!tag)
Decision
If
select Bs
1
; if E then B2 end if ;
B3 [] B4 end select
tag:=2; select Bs
1
;
if E then tag:=1 else tag:=0 end if;
if E then B2 end if ; B3 []
B4 end select P (!tag)
Case
select Bs
1
; case V in V1 → B2
|V2 → B3 end case;
B4 [] B5 end select
tag1:=2; tag2:=2; select Bs
1
;
case V in V1 → tag1 := 1;B2
|V2 → tag1 := 0; tag2 := 1;B3 end case;
...end select;
P1(!tag1); P2(!tag2)
While
select Bs
1
; while E loop B2
end loop; B3[]B4 end select
tag1:=2; tag2:=2; select Bs
1
;
if E then tag1:=1 else tag1:=0 end if;
while ... end loop;
if E then tag2:=1 else tag2:=0 end if;
B3[]B4 end select; P (!tag1); P (!tag2)
3.3 Behavior Preservation
In this section, we prove the behavioral equivalence between the original LNT
specification and the one with inserted probes hidden as internal actions, which
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is called an extended specification in the following. We consider here branching
bisimulation, which is one of the finest behavioral equivalences studied in process
theory [22]. This equivalence preserves the branching structure of systems by
considering all intermediate states including those with internal transitions. We
prove the branching equivalence directly on LNT specification, which is actually
a process algebra. The underlying model of process algebra is its corresponding
LTS, where each process represents a state in its LTS.
Definition 7 (Branching bisimulation). A branching bisimulation relation R is
a binary relation over a process algebra such that it is symmetric and satisfies
the following transfer property: if pRq and p
a
−→ p′, then one of the two following
conditions should be satisfied:
– a = τ and p′Rq;
– there is a sequence of transitions q
τ∗
−→ q′′
a
−→ q′, pRq′′ and p′Rq′.
If there is a branching bisimulation relation R between p and q, then p and q are
branching bisimilar, denoted by p ≈b q.
Theorem 1 Let s be an LNT specification, s′ be its corresponding extended
specification (both s and s′ are processes), then s and s′ are branching bisimilar,
i.e., s ≈b s
′.
Proof. From Definition 7 and the fact that the only difference between s and s′
is the set of inserted probes that are considered as internal actions, it follows
that to prove this theorem, we have to show that ∀τP ∈ s
′, where τP represents
a probe considered as an internal action, for a binary relation R, the condition
Υ is satisfied, where Υ : ∀τP ∈ s
′, p
τP−−→ p′ ⇒ pRp′. This means that any inserted
probe has no impact on the original behaviors in terms of branching structures.
Next we demonstrate, without loss of generality, that this is true for each probe.
1. For an action a in any composition or construct, it can be directly deduced
that its corresponding probe satisfies the condition Υ , from the silent step
law in process algebra, denoted by Lτ : a.τP ≈b a (CCS-like notation, which
will be used in the following for the sake of brievity).
2. For a block B, we analyze its corresponding probe in three different con-
structs separately, i.e., sequential, parallel and choice.
– For B in a sequential composition that is not inside any parallel and
choice construct, its probe satisfies the condition Υ since it is not possible
for this probe to change the branching structure.
– For B in a parallel composition that is not inside any choice construct,
there are two possible situations. One is that the corresponding probe
τP inserted for B is the first action in the corresponding parallel branch,
where B must be a silent block. Another one is that τP is not the first
action in this branch. For the latter one, τP satisfies Υ from Lτ . Now we
analyze the first situation in the following way.
Base case: consider (τP .a)||b, for which we have τP .a||b = τP .(a||b) +
b.τP .a. From this, the τP in b.τP .a satisfies Υ . Moreover, from Lτ , we
further get τP .(a||b) + b.τP .a = τP .(a||b) + b.a. Now we show that this
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τP also satisfies Υ because b.a is included in a||b since a||b = a.b+ b.a.
Induction: now consider (τP .a)||(b1.....bn) = τP .(a||(b1.....
bn))+b1.((τP .a)||(b2.....bn)). Now we suppose that τP in (τP .a)||(b2.....bn)
satisfies Υ and thus can be reduced to a||(b2.....bn). This follows that the
first τP also satisfies Υ since b1.(a||(b2.....bn)) is included in (a||(b1.....bn)).
In the same way, the induction is applied to structures with more than
two parallel branches.
– For B in a parallel composition that itself is inside a choice construct,
suppose that there is no action before B in the corresponding branch
and B is a silent block. Then B is a critical block and its corresponding
probe is inserted after the choice construct, which satisfies Υ .
– For B in a choice construct, either B is a critical block, or there is an
action before B. For the former case, the corresponding probe is inserted
after the choice construct and thus satisfies Υ . The probe of the latter
case also satisfies Υ from Lτ .
3. For a decision E, if it is not critical, the probe satisfy Υ from Lτ . If it is
critical, we avoid τP .a+ b 6≈b a+ b by inserting the corresponding probe in
the sequential composition after the choice construct, which then satisfies Υ .
Actually the demonstration follows the exact same line as described above
for blocks.
Now we have shown that each probe inserted as described in Section 3.2 does
not alter the original behaviors of the system in terms of branching structure
and this proves this theorem. 
3.4 Coverage Computing
If we simultaneously insert probes for all three criteria to compute their coverage,
the corresponding LTSs would suffer from the state explosion problem. To solve
this, we separate the coverage analysis into two steps. In a first step, we insert
probes for blocks and decisions to reveal those uncovered. The entry of a block
may be controlled by the outcome of a decision, e.g., the true outcome of an
if instruction allows the execution to enter its associated block. For such a
block, its coverage may be prevented by two possible reasons: the outcome of
its controlling decision prohibits the execution from entering it, or only a part
of the block is executed due to non-synchronizable actions. In a second step, we
are more interested in those partially covered blocks whose entry is allowed by
a decision to discover non-synchronizable actions.
Definition 8 (Dependency of block on decision).
– Given a block b and a decision d, if the execution of b is dependent of the true
(false, resp.) outcome of d, this dependency is denoted by b⇒pd d (b⇒nd d,
resp.).
– If b⇒pd d or b⇒nd d, we denote it b⇒d d.
A block whose entry is allowed is an executable block. Such a block either has
no dependent decision or is permitted to be entered by its associated decision.
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In other words, if an executable block is dependent of the true (false, resp.)
outcome of a decision d, then this outcome of d is covered.
Definition 9 (Executable block). A block b is executable if one of the following
conditions is satisfied:
– ∄d such that b⇒d d;
– if b⇒d d, then either b⇒pd d and C
D:t(d), or b⇒nd d and C
D:f (d).
Definition 10 (Partially covered block). A block is a partially covered block if
it is executable but not covered.
Figure 1 overviews our coverage analysis in two steps. In the first step, we
repeatedly apply the specification with probes for both blocks and decisions on
each validation example to obtain the corresponding LTS. Block and decision
coverages are simultaneously analyzed on these LTSs to obtain their coverage
results, denoted by RBC and RDC , respectively. We have RBC = {BC, ΓUB}
and RDC = {DC,ΓCD:t , ΓCD:f }, where BC (DC, resp.) is the percentage of
block (decision, resp.) coverage, ΓUB is the set of uncovered blocks, and ΓCD:t
(ΓCD:f , resp.) is the set of decisions whose true (false, resp.) outcome is covered.
We can deduce whether an uncovered block is executable and thus calculate
the set of partially covered blocks with RBC and RDC . In the second step, we
insert probes for actions in this set of blocks before obtaining the corresponding
LTSs and then perform action coverage analysis. The result of action coverage
is RAC = {AC, ΓPA}, where AC is the percentage of action coverage, and ΓPA
is the set of non-synchronizable actions.
set of partially 
covered blocks
+
acon coverage
analysis
RAC
block & decision 
coverage analysis
        LTSs
       LNT spe.  (blocks  & 
    decisions)  + examples
     LNT spe. (acons) 
          + examples
        LTSs
STEP 1 STEP 2
RBC RDC
Fig. 1. Overview of coverage analysis in two steps.
3.5 Results Analysis
Given the coverage results described in the precedent section, two reasons can
explain why the coverage percentages are lower than 100%:
1. lack of validation examples;
2. defects contained in the corresponding LNT specification.
For the first reason, the solution is to add examples that can explore those
missing execution scenarios. For instance, suppose that the false outcome of a
decision is never covered by the current dataset, we should add examples where
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the value of this decision can be evaluated to false. If there is no such exam-
ples, then we should consider the second reason. For example, if we define one
specification with two input parameters and both have two possible values, then
we have in total four validation examples. In this case, if a coverage percentage
cannot achieve 100%, then there must be some errors in the specification since
there is no other possible examples (for illustration see the case study named
AgtReconfig in Section 4). We list in the following the different types of errors
that may be the source of the uncovered parts, which can be deduced thanks to
the results obtained in the precedent section, e.g., ΓCD:f , ΓCD:t , ΓPA, etc.:
– Ill-formed decision: given a decision d such that d ∈ ΓCD:f and d /∈ ΓCD:t
(d ∈ ΓCD:t and d /∈ ΓCD:f , resp.), if ∃b, such that b ⇒pd d (b ⇒nd d, resp.),
this means that the uncovered outcome of a decision controls at least one
block. Such situation is probably due to an ill-formed decision. For example,
if a block is within an if conditional construct that always has false outcome,
then this block is never covered.
– Unnecessary decision: given a decision d such that d ∈ ΓCD:f and d /∈
ΓCD:t (d ∈ ΓCD:t and d /∈ ΓCD:f , resp.), if ∄b, such that b ⇒pd d (b ⇒nd d,
resp.), this means that the uncovered outcome of a decision controls no
block. Such decisions can be safely removed, e.g., the false outcome of an if
conditional construct is never achieved.
– Non-synchronizable actions: for an action a, if a ∈ ΓPA, then its cor-
responding synchronization is ill-designed, i.e., there is bad match between
the received and the sent parameter types of the corresponding actions.
– Dead code: a piece of unreachable code in an uncovered block b ∈ ΓUB is
called dead code if it is not due to the errors described above. This may be
caused for example by wrong location of stop.
4 Evaluation
We have implemented our approach as a tool called CAL (Coverage Analysis
of LNT). In this section, we first present the architecture of CAL joined with
CADP before showing some experimental results. We also show how our two-
step analysis can reduce the state space explosion problem compared to a more
naive approach, where the three coverage criteria are simultaneously computed.
4.1 Implementation
The architecture of CAL with the cooperation of CADP is shown in Figure 2.
The input of CAL is an LNT specification with a dataset of validation exam-
ples. The LNT specification is instrumented with probes for different criteria as
described in Section 3.2. Then CAL calls CADP compilers to repeatedly apply
the instrumented LNT specification on each validation example to obtain its
corresponding explicit LTS. In this way, we can obtain a set of LTSs associated
to the dataset of examples. Afterwards, the ANALYSER tool of CAL measures
the coverage percentage and provides other results as described in Section 3.4.
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All experiments were conducted on a server machine that has six 3.07 GHz pro-
cessors and 11.7 GB of RAM. Considering that CADP has interfaces for reading
LTSs that can be used by an application program written in C or C++, CAL
is implemented in C, using gcc with version 3.4.3. The version of CADP used in
our evaluation is BETA-VERSION 2014-c ”Amsterdam”.
2nd step
LNT2LOTOS
CADP 
compilerINSTRUMENTER
ANALYSER
LNT specification
 
Coverage
results
Set of explicit
LTSs
CAL CADP
Dataset of 
validation examples
 
extended 
specification
 
Coverage
 criteria
 
Fig. 2. Implementation architecture of CAL with CADP.
4.2 Experimental Results
To evaluate our approach, we have applied our tool to more than one hundred
LNT specifications, including six real-world case studies in different application
areas (hardware, cloud computing, multi-agent systems, and synchronization
protocols). Table 4 lists the six case studies with their designer and a short
description.
Table 5 lists both the size of the six case studies, i.e., number of lines and
validation examples, and their coverage results. Their size varies from 196 to
3700 lines. The number of validation examples differs from several to 200, which
depends on the available input domain. For example, in the specification of
AgtReconfig, the major process is defined with only two parameters that has
two possible values. In this case, we can have four validation examples in total.
In this table, we show two versions for the Synchro case study, the first
version is called Synchro1 and the second one Synchro2. The second version was
obtained using our coverage results on the first version, as described in Section
3.4 and Section 3.5. Particularly, the block coverage was improved from 62.1%
to 100%. This demonstrates the interest of the subsequent utilization of the
measured coverage information computed by our approach. Precisely, to achieve
100% for this case study, the authors have not only added 12 complementary
validation examples but have also corrected several non-synchronizable actions.
Another point is that for several case studies (DirectCache, DisCache, and
ReConfig), all uncovered blocks were not executable, which is shown in Figure 3.
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Table 4. Details of six real-world case studies.
Case Study Designer Description
DirectCache STMicroelectronics
deals with cache coherence in multiprocessor
systems by using a common directory.
AgtReconfig Inria
provides an agent-based mechanism
allowing distributed applications
to be reconfigured at run-time [8].
DisCache STMicroelectronics
ensures data consistency in multiprocessor
shared memory systems that allow
multiple copies of a datum [1].
SelfConfig Inria, Orange labs
automates the configuration of a cloud application
that is distributed on more than one virtual machine
without requiring any centralized server [9, 24, 10].
ReConfig Inria, Orange labs
reconfigures a running system composed of a set of
interconnected components, where multiple failures
occurring at reconfiguration time are tolerated [5].
Synchro Inria
realizes the multiway rendezvous of LNT,
where all parallel processes are
organized in a hierarchical structure [11].
Table 5. Experimental results, where NL: number of lines, NV E: number of valida-
tion examples, NB (ND, NA, resp.): number of blocks (decisions, actions, resp.), BC
(DC,AC, resp.): block (decision, action, resp.) coverage.
DirectCache AgtReconfig DisCache SelfConfig ReConfig Synchro1 Synchro2
NL 196 785 981 1635 3700 486 480
NV E 5 4 6 60 200 18 30
NB 12 31 33 31 90 66 66
BC 83.3% 67.7% 93.9% 83.8% 97.8% 62.1% 100%
ND 12 27 23 23 89 50 50
DC 83.3% 74.1% 91.3% 73.9% 92.1% 60% 100%
NA 9 50 33 32 53 72 72
AC 100% 64% 100% 93.8% 96.2% 68.1% 100%
In this case, the first step of coverage analysis is sufficient. For other case stud-
ies, the majority of uncovered blocks were not executable. This means that we
consider very few blocks in the action analysis.
Besides improving the quality of validation examples, our coverage analysis
also identified all types of errors described in Section 3.5. For example, several
crucial ill-formed decisions affecting the whole system behaviors were detected
and corrected for ReConfig, which were not discovered by model checking. An-
other point that we want to emphasize is that the analysis results can help in
correcting the corresponding bugs in the implementation. In ReConfig for in-
stance, the ill-formed decisions in the LNT specification, detected in the LTS
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Fig. 3. Executability of uncovered blocks.
models, helped the developers of the corresponding Java implementation (Or-
ange labs) to locate and correct them immediately.
To show the efficiency of our approach, we compare it with a more naive
approach, where three criteria are simultaneously analyzed. We greatly reduce
the number of probes for all case studies that we tested when adopting our
approach in two steps. Take AgtReconfig as example, the total number of probes
is 108 with the naive approach and is only 60 with ours. In our experiments, the
reduced number of states and transitions for all case studies are between 30% and
60% thanks to the reduced number of probes. Furthermore, for some validation
examples of Synchro2, we could not even construct the corresponding LTSs using
the naive approach within a reasonable time (a few hours) but succeeded using
ours within one hour.
5 Related Work
Step-by-step execution for LOTOS is proposed in [17], which is also called in-
teractive simulation. The authors take the role of the environment by providing
events to the specification and then by observing the results. Although useful for
debugging, step-by-step execution is probably the simplest and weakest valida-
tion technique available for LOTOS. In [4], the authors propose to measure the
completeness of an example suite in terms of the structural coverage described
in LOTOS, where a probe is inserted after every action to check its achievement.
However, they do not consider the decisions, whose coverage may have an impor-
tant impact on the action coverage. The authors of [12] consider action, decision,
and condition coverage for LOTOS. These criteria are measured totally sepa-
rately. Furthermore, both works do not check behavioral equivalence between
the original specification and the extended one. By using new actions as probes,
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their insertion techniques imply that only weak trace equivalence is preserved.
This is the weakest equivalence and thus not suitable for safety-critical systems,
where altering branching structure could have serious consequences since an in-
ternal transition may alter the desired behavior of the system. Furthermore,
compared to keeping weak trace equivalence, we guarantee the finest branching
equivalence with probes considered as internal action, which however does not
degrade the performance. The reason is that to preserve branching equivalence,
as described in Section 3.2, for each critical block and critical decision, we only
move their corresponding probe from inside the corresponding choice construct
to after it. In other words, the number of probes required is not increased.
In [18], the authors propose an approach to test specifications by first formu-
lating properties that should hold in the specification and then applying model
checking or theorem proving to find violations. However, it is very difficult to
select the set of properties such that they can evaluate all behaviors in the spec-
ification. This is also the case for LNT specification, where some faults detected
by our coverage analysis cannot be identified by model checking. Model checking
techniques are also used to automatically generate test cases that satisfy cover-
age criteria [15]. Similarly, in [14], a suite of test sequences are generated from
SCR requirements specification by using a model checker’s ability to construct
counterexamples. Differently, our approach does not only improve the quality
of validation examples, but more importantly detect faults in the specification
through coverage analysis.
Coverage based testing is a widely used technique in software engineering
and different coverage criteria are described in classical books on software test-
ing, e.g., [21]. Test coverage is considered as an essential factor to enhance new
proposed models for software reliability estimation. For example, Piwowarsky et
al. [23] predict software reliability based on the fact that the fault removal rate
is a linear function of the code coverage. Cai and Lyu [6] propose to incorporate
testing time and test coverage together into one single mathematical form to es-
timate the software reliability. However, in this paper, our goal is not to discover
the quantitative relation between coverage analysis and fault detection rate but
to directly debug formal specification by using coverage techniques.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new approach to debug process algebra speci-
fications, illustrated by LNT. First, we have introduced several coverage notions
before showing how to insert probes to measure them by keeping the same be-
haviors. Second, we have proposed the coverage analysis in two steps such that
we are able to find out uncovered parts keeping the number of probes as small
as possible. The obtained results can be considered as efficient guides to either
complete validation examples or correct errors in the given specification. Third,
we have applied our implemented tool, CAL, to six real-world case studies. It is
worth pointing out that our approach can also be applied to other value-passing
process algebra such as CSP with FDR2 or Promela with SPIN.
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So far we have defined an elementary set of coverage criteria, therefore one
perspective of our work is to extend to other criteria for coverage analysis, such
as multiple condition coverage, modified condition/decision coverage variants,
or some criteria based on data flow [3].
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